Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1d0f057685918b29…

MALICIOUS

RTF

706.5 KB Created: 2019-04-15 15:36:00 First seen: 2020-07-02
MD5: fbfa81da9bf5ad57d478e433b03d2d10 SHA-1: f9304113a04de1ed3deebf3f333e7f3a1d94acc3 SHA-256: 1d0f057685918b29af2979374685d3e844f2980a4d1f072d7d6dc4910c40ab86
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects and triggers an OLE activation via \objupdate, which is a strong indicator of exploitation. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759 confirms the exploitation of this specific vulnerability to achieve code execution. The embedded benign URL is not considered a malicious IOC.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 10 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002cde.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2CDE 22587 bytes
SHA-256: c80270bb9aeed695a16e66e7ef2a14b4a7ead6163ec41557827ac752214940b8
objdata_01_off0001371f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1371F 22587 bytes
SHA-256: 353310112c0fdc7af8bea18e614bee6b14fdbdb45fbff00779a6847f7551d702
objdata_02_off00024160.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x24160 22587 bytes
SHA-256: 76cdf35115be9ff8efe58fef80429e3254a552f87b92746f78c2fc3afba4ffb3
objdata_03_off00034ba1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x34BA1 22587 bytes
SHA-256: 3c894d7d0c0b6858e970465de6f587cf015c9a1e6ac8628a245c5ce066888f0c
objdata_04_off000455e2.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x455E2 22587 bytes
SHA-256: 24ffa9f73740ea299ea8e61a600f1076de0ba10448df58d66e3152ba49c5c3c7
objdata_05_off00056023.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x56023 22587 bytes
SHA-256: aedb8dbc562c57537783ab35d7dd3a404cadea848184eb73c06b7e1aaf86cf86
objdata_06_off00066a64.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x66A64 22587 bytes
SHA-256: 8e49f6b1d37a63a8f4e249e8f5f97c30c904bf7d4db6cbff46f23d394e809ccd
objdata_07_off000774a5.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x774A5 22587 bytes
SHA-256: a2026730cc4d3b636c3b03c3313a271991aaa070bfd2c98c8bec6530a5b2815a
objdata_08_off00087ee6.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x87EE6 22587 bytes
SHA-256: 0c695e0f83968441e784f94cf8a931312f0c452133f7049546eb000277ddb3e0
objdata_09_off00098927.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x98927 22587 bytes
SHA-256: ccad537b569bd50d1d3c75f57452458d1531b4b0f8fb921cde1be862e76ca154