Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1d079b1a365ec420…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.13 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: a753d2e6285c6237fa2e1da33e044562 SHA-1: 93f1498d5e44ce92751444addff8911f640858d4 SHA-256: 1d079b1a365ec420c2f3b2e30af662ab5e1b365589946f3cda875462bdabad28
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains critical heuristic firings for Equation Editor and CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation of a vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of OLE object data and the ".objupdate" directive further suggest that the document is designed to activate embedded objects, likely to trigger the exploit. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing content, but the technical indicators strongly point to a client-side exploit for code execution.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00115716.bin
68863ed80cc003f7115b1278041565104357c4cd9f604ec717febd65b6949849		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x115716 3739 bytes

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