Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1d006668af35937d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

136.0 KB
MD5: 62236501e2e3e29850cace1cfa4a37da SHA-1: 635adaa45e135cab781476260ea0e02fb9225167 SHA-256: 1d006668af35937d0c9f089d8e663982b642037f0b4bcf4121245d80ce3436c7
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an OLE document with a significant slack space anomaly, indicating potential obfuscation or embedded malicious content. Heuristics indicate references to VirtualProtect, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, commonly used by malware to load and execute code. No document body or scripts were extracted to provide further context on the specific attack vector or payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 139,264 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 107,913 bytes (77%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main