MALICIOUS
142
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link
T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1566 Phishing
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
The sample is an encrypted Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL Moniker. This technique is used to download and execute a remote loader from the specified URL. The document itself is encrypted, preventing direct analysis of its content, but the exploit carrier shape and the embedded URL are strong indicators of malicious intent.
Heuristics 5
-
OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
-
Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPEDefault-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
-
Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGEOLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
-
Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXMLOLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://jmcglone.com@clik.rip/L7y79
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.