Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1cf33c03f9299fd5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.9 KB Created: 2020-08-03 02:10:42 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 9308c68923a27ff8ece2921e113f84f9 SHA-1: 614d67eb5ce5d7e3b125941be488f611a4b88048 SHA-256: 1cf33c03f9299fd52e70fda4768a9af3450bc31d52032f88f4afd1ef8539ea7d
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a malicious redirector link disguised as a lure for 'Gta san andreas trainers'. The heuristic 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' confirms this link points to known malicious infrastructure. Additionally, the 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document's intent is to trick the user into downloading a password-protected archive, a common tactic to bypass security gateways. The embedded URLs, including the primary redirector, are the highest priority IOCs.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=gta+san+andreas+trainers
    • http://files.jpguiao.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775537/dipoxukakosikez.pdf
    • http://files.busseltonrifleclub.com.au/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408942/funajatuz.pdf
    • http://files.myceia.org/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070713/4218354.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2897/1674/files/81618271508.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9050/1020/files/26759609470.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0831/8878/files/debezepokuxejizejoj.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/86556218032.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3237/0584/files/zelijasafexiwiwawuzowi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/1769/7437/files/gilorebevopopijotomotudo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9869/4049/files/19130936738.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/1202/1657/files/mofabugaduzikalow.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2857/8467/files/javascript_project_ideas.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2064/7576/files/bekagenubaw.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2670/1718/files/91792702274.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005f14.bin
cef09ca03da885119f441490d32427acfaa9b812389f4cf2d95a19b7ae683456		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F14 4820 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006f82.bin
3e8f4bdecb9e0d8d22dd6f056218211cd02f4461d99f75c583d50299df8c681a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F82 10420 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.