Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1cf16af6389c86aa…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.6 KB
MD5: a93593f29a42b78d8463cb897e4502fc SHA-1: d253c8362ac8cb87230e9a51018e96ad10eb5ac2 SHA-256: 1cf16af6389c86aad615052d3e888c7b67692eb1deae5eae18114502f56770bf
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers an Equation Editor exploit. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to execute embedded malicious content. This pattern is commonly used to deliver second-stage payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d6.bin
140b2f3bfc2b02195d45128f19c62d33ab1da0b60c31070f5c3c933766b5602e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD6 1549 bytes