Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ce6086bef6d49c4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.7 KB Created: 2021-08-04 05:49:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 956a5aa027234054ee6f00e33ff8d395 SHA-1: 3c7863774daaad51061be1867a7308fa3323a5a7 SHA-256: 1ce6086bef6d49c480e168534083b06cde8ea4381ccac2f26d86e85697b2ddb3
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs pointing to various domains, many of which appear to be compromised or disposable hosting. Heuristics indicate it functions as a link farm, potentially leading users to phishing sites or further malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, classifying it as a phishing trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9976

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://infrive.ru/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+book+your+theory+test+northern+ireland
    • https://www.notusweb.com.br/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/4926210658.pdf
    • http://marsalanoleggio.it/userfiles/files/risebolatinefibixapajap.pdf
    • https://bawwabatrizq.com/userfiles/file/22226895579.pdf
    • https://greshamgilessalon.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/783f87556353662d45d0414a21c3984d/22133951878.pdf
    • http://topopentertainment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160e4df7098c17---sotoruse.pdf
    • http://blog.crowdly.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085b630666b1---400966764.pdf
    • http://ttccid.com/userfiles/file/vepozexufe.pdf
    • http://pk.mo/userfiles/file/75247537857.pdf
    • https://earplighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6816ef4d751a339a31e5badb17c36d42/vumaxokesamafoseke.pdf
    • https://ohligschlaeger-berger.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b439740d91d---repiwuxufalupomev.pdf
    • http://pcmcpropertyblog.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/97aff4d1f6347cb9edf4e37bf5a5c926/70943733491.pdf
    • https://hssanesteban.cl/files/59574452104.pdf
    • http://xperion.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5630152703b3a40609e45d2c1ff7bff6/53728806923.pdf
    • http://stroynerud-sm.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a4566da30d2---84826289817.pdf
    • http://matchonusa.com/uploads/files/xirugaviroxame.pdf
    • http://www.kmclogistics.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ab17a926980437c5833113df1397986f/52594009187.pdf
    • https://shotclock.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5d177d9de6999ad975dd84d0742072a0/11140455128.pdf
    • https://vannordenvastgoed.nl/userfiles/file/mufajijobaxememajifewi.pdf
    • https://baconbites.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/oqcfjifjjgtoc4l54crnqumr92/62634446825.pdf
    • https://www.denisonlandscaping.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16099f17d5fb17---terinarawupubegiwusolam.pdf
    • https://www.projectorrentals.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1610417b0b9dc1---49440373696.pdf
    • http://medicaldistri.com/ckfinder_files/files/12223059898.pdf
    • http://kioskcondoweb.wpengine.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160e8d4f6a1b95---70997310929.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000efec.bin
26fbfb7d7a34fefaa5ad65ffd200786deec84bcd73b4e5ec360111dead945ac7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFEC 16856 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011bba.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11BBA 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000133d1.bin
1b8c81f3b5cc03134523ebbcd935b3f5cd94932dd6ace52130a1efa2ce64a70e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x133D1 10868 bytes