Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ce46f86a092a552…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

444.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-03
MD5: de2866f237dbf0a2b85e26d80c56279b SHA-1: f717129b1873e90e78173794e51ee056fb0dd342 SHA-256: 1ce46f86a092a55271cc028739981ea665f13482a9b8361959a0c8a70c626e4e
132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to fetch and execute a remote document. The embedded VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, suggesting the primary malicious functionality is within the OLE structure itself. The presence of an embedded PDF with suspicious static findings further indicates a multi-stage attack. The primary IOC is the URL used for the initial download.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://103.37.60.77/iso/Document_20022949450%23.doc

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_003_off00007760.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x7760 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf
de6b0f54d9fb4b232456bf7d38e26f4d2d45c7fabff1ef0e3614c7c90acd03c2		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00 451584 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00007c00.pdf
b00faff6aa2f7ae6c9eec4eb614ba2c7fe8366459bedf91f663db5ad29256ae9		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x7C00 423424 bytes

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