Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ca02ba74aea8ba8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 5efa9acd3de1e76a18bde273b004fbc1 SHA-1: fb5a3a821d5895cfc6613d8da7bfd10d70182841 SHA-256: 1ca02ba74aea8ba82f409f9f1aa2f525f16c32dc39dac85cde5f891a7e6284e2
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor exploitation. The \objupdate directive forces OLE object activation, indicating an attempt to leverage this vulnerability for code execution. No scripts or document body text were extracted, but the presence of the Equation Editor exploit is sufficient to classify the attack pattern.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a8.bin
b1eb48145532312126c883c3e7b7bd879a4d8817ef7166773404f19b6c243938
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA8 1836 bytes