Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c9fc14f228a6b03…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.6 KB Created: 2021-01-03 12:18:32 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: 379f5570516d63942f5c96588718d8f6 SHA-1: 91640236e0e99d3f002b44c6adfdf640d2c99700 SHA-256: 1c9fc14f228a6b03a92bfecd271908c70c8b550c453b722b4f1e63e44b87ec8c
186 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting it functions as a link farm. The embedded URL 'https://trafficel.ru/aws?utm_term=zenonia+5+weapon+guide' and numerous Weebly links indicate a potential phishing or malware distribution scheme. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself is designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/aws?utm_term=zenonia+5+weapon+guide PDF link annotation
    • https://rijevolokawuja.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134661742/0b57b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sivirezu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134445297/fuwemusobun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kexezesokofu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133986719/jonow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rudiduwusoxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134445317/8873000.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://munuteme.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134862418/8804718.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bonuxomudod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814593/6f161e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4393035/normal_5fa3311deb448.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tivifetanesa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135347176/fapadex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://denijebif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134584122/vofovajekisisisem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ronalowo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134872729/vemukipadejerak-kobevov-nasibefo-benovu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1900a45b-4dc0-4948-ab5e-2f92dedd40ac/dapak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4b6ec9a8-b100-4476-b0d6-afabc7cd287f/supreme_pizza_toppings.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4431e3b5-077c-44bd-98ed-ce83d3e8e0b9/gogiwimuzexosifajem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fbb7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFBB7 4996 bytes
SHA-256: ff20ddcb455466f1aa03fa61a43ec9e46b650f5796d27d87f70b621d51fffb7b
font_01_sfnt_off00010ce4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10CE4 10880 bytes
SHA-256: 781da7c2afadf1bba29ab15aec4cf29803f8b046262b8e52a3af0325f97c0bc1

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.