Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c9bbe414128de9b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

500.8 KB
MD5: c977721c2b6e22a4bb29bc723e88dc14 SHA-1: 33e5d7488767291024cbf2581fbe360384c7d67a SHA-256: 1c9bbe414128de9b946727e8ac7fe2edf9c28731fabbc564dee935a97721d358
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with one being automatically linked and triggered for update. This technique is commonly used to bypass Office macro security settings and execute malicious code. The presence of the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic further suggests the document is designed to trick the user into enabling content execution. No specific family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
c9ef7324859e25bc209357dfd7a83b1825f7e304e587e1ad85198dae727012c6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 154315 bytes
objdata_01_off0004efd8.bin
9d9bc825f2fa5e0ed8db7dce6823e199ad9c775873472d42887214589f205470
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4EFD8 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0005057b.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5057B 12297 bytes