Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c854d0c9e42c5d8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.9 KB Created: 2020-11-09 03:40:46 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2022-06-20
MD5: 4e031798484f139e6a7ca27b9f8e929e SHA-1: 26fc6bad82c8aec9092e0e17c2eca57c3b93b1f4 SHA-256: 1c854d0c9e42c5d87446c523ef276925e3a8cfc40cbebf4de9da6857350e22f7
234 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/aws?keyword=ms+office+2013+product+key+free+download In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374517/normal_5f8f5dad08b27.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c4562e66-c830-4f7f-9951-825d0372ab3f/zulibumavubusewavadabiwe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/32fa4da9-8303-43f0-a2dc-4b5d051ebcba/99813180547.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dedalepu.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/inventory_management_in_retail_store.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/takateg/1978_cutlass_supreme_coupe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xapidajovaji/itn_practice_skills_assessment_-_packet_tracer_type_c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1eebbb82-aaff-447b-b2f9-415387a1f074/doduzutinonabeja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tagorarib/contract_with_god_trilogy.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://direpupiwabe248790905.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/10856063596.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f4688f0c-5f75-44ac-b746-8e6da9b82755/9924607404.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mabimufifu.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/69702276747.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6b59050b-d2de-48de-8fdb-83d637fa5162/86747871271.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/juvuraguvutoxif/kixapuririreturelo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006dbb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6DBB 5900 bytes
SHA-256: 013a64a6e29398edcb3248c198deeac2d2231c30a1dffd684680c91c75534b60
font_01_sfnt_off0000820e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x820E 10688 bytes
SHA-256: d7e54f987aa303db0e5f0a5116f7e238518ae8cc3a1adcd69b54e6b8505c104b

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