Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c77a9354c8b78eb…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

488.1 KB First seen: 2022-10-18
MD5: 97eac9d2f5de0516738991f942ac5a23 SHA-1: a3190f529c5e1acb4dec09d04eb874b61f7f87b8 SHA-256: 1c77a9354c8b78eb256e3cc66cd84383ab510e7c0f7dfeaa729eec4e9f3f0b39
340 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation, specifically related to OLE object vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-8570 and CVE-2017-0199/CVE-2017-8759. These vulnerabilities are used to automatically link and update OLE objects, facilitating the download and execution of a secondary payload. The document body also contains a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable Editing', which is a common tactic to bypass macro security settings and initiate the malicious process.

Heuristics 9

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 3cd3b7d42e 51 samples

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000983.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x983 141047 bytes
SHA-256: 5a5c5809b219286b33e9239b31c95d1ff976d96d2c7baa741b2ec1b7a80c953a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_01_off00004291.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4291 141021 bytes
SHA-256: 7a717e4627e5676c0bb636627362fd2a91dc7411ee48a5403243a67fd8aaac05
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_02_off0004bcfe.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4BCFE 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 3cd3b7d42e5855c90d6d11c54ef2670ed8970441480cc23f7d39ef08fa1c935b
objdata_03_off0004d2a1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4D2A1 12297 bytes
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7