RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 1c70882051a5b725

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.30 MB

MD5: dc27adc9ac30cc0de96a0babf896cc74 SHA-1: 984fd4d264aad2432654aee42fefa1d2c7191081 SHA-256: 1c70882051a5b725ee8ac98b24ad6e6a1b867dcad1cdb5acf82e84fe4f8cc109

262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, including critical heuristic firings related to Equation Editor OLE objects and automatic linking. The presence of a large, high-entropy OLE object suggests it is hiding a second-stage payload. The attack pattern is consistent with delivering an exploit via a malicious attachment.

Heuristics 7

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX

RTF contains ~3464KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000007f.bin` `b5dc1515a3a68a40bf0772376232f1168d820ce8b2ba2920ce0ee1f4e3483157`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7F	1732431 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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