RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 1c67159406e3a096

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

33.3 KB First seen: 2023-05-25

MD5: c0cd3ed58902fe2a55454b8f550745b3 SHA-1: 0db0841fcc2e3ac51eafe0c113955f0c58c6da15 SHA-256: 1c67159406e3a096d7745b83d5a1021a3bfba7295a96a8cc695b10cc2fc21751

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content. The presence of RTF_OBJUPDATE indicates that the OLE object is configured to activate automatically upon opening, likely triggering the Equation Editor exploit.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000040cd.bin` `215265ff509d09e77f51a6add6a25bb90b79caf8f1db1a7bd880ebd66bf4b764`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x40CD	1605 bytes

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