Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c59abb9e5b4ceec…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1020.4 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 562c82e2b833e23e3a7462ad3880f0d0 SHA-1: 6f618837fc6644dc12081674c930230309273845 SHA-256: 1c59abb9e5b4ceec9797d3d3f99be2583fe6a2372a07e89ad523b9398bdf758e
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The file is an RTF document that leverages OLE object data and activation to exploit CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code when the OLE object is activated. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics, along with the critical CVE_2017_8759 firing, strongly indicates this exploitation vector. The embedded URL, though marked as benign, is part of the document structure related to OLE objects.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000e9166.bin
5f5988bad6f5998180594b8f9e28edaf3f0ee7e9e50c656d6d9c99ef94504df4
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE9166 1478 bytes