Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c56efe06f43adbb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

99.9 KB
MD5: a07856358f32b326261ede3c56d167dc SHA-1: d4a3dfc6b2c7ca28b0dc9fd1e719a6c3e33feeea SHA-256: 1c56efe06f43adbb06a15203d9c9e7b4d9f5ec10cdcad379af7faa0e5bf0bece
136 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution

This PDF document exploits the CVE-2010-0188 vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA forms and LibTIFF images. The embedded script payload within the XFA form is designed to trigger this exploit, leading to the execution of a malicious payload. The presence of an embedded file further supports the malicious intent.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
e2cd5e4ec6910d300303dd3280fa6c5e875e0fee1c3be2d444b454f6486bcc28
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 101508 bytes