Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c31aec73d974902…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

672.3 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: a51f39013924bb649d2b69f493091cef SHA-1: 6cd1621aec39038e03699e01d2491557d49e445a SHA-256: 1c31aec73d9749029501493d6fc112510c6f37c3600d41606586cc2b57b2e025
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious Attachment T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor, specifically exploiting CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution upon activation of the OLE object. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJUPDATE, and CVE_2017_8759 heuristics strongly indicates this exploit vector. The document body was not sufficiently readable to determine a specific lure, but the exploit mechanism is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000a35ce.bin
d62260c55df7128ca3e94e8ae9996df314f3144152e0df918076d4d5d885841a		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA35CE 3739 bytes

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