Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c2bf16c5ad8739b…

MALICIOUS

RTF

457.0 KB First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: b50faf636470945497ecb277fa338042 SHA-1: 92346a03ea2da593beb9d0ad45766724b43c19ef SHA-256: 1c2bf16c5ad8739bb77328f53651dade31be0d2a1c5e8c4f3dac6dcd51f4b449
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that triggers CVE-2017-11882, a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This exploit allows for the execution of arbitrary code, which is highly indicative of a payload delivery mechanism. The presence of ".objupdate" and ".objautolink" further suggests that the embedded object is intended to be activated automatically upon opening the document.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000174d.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x174D 3621 bytes
SHA-256: e5c11112d7953097e12ebeac1794ee174b3d6551a08b0ab2691d0ea1dca4660f