Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c2b838401c06b33…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.6 KB Created: 2021-05-22 10:05:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7fbcb2d7ef94869e74b86938b0cf075d SHA-1: 4cb6cc9a42f9f67bbc05fa97cd02e2bb5a41a6cf SHA-256: 1c2b838401c06b33e1a9e3af9430895f55d64bce33f0d62d157d52137b81b664
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or phishing attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are consistent with techniques used to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://xajibur.ru/strik?utm_term=tuhfatul+atfal+en+fran%25C3%25A7ais+pdf
    • https://viwututegipe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134360281/dofijixutubuwixivuja.pdf
    • https://zazuxari.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319397/rataxidujo.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4410217/normal_6005f26984765.pdf
    • https://risogaruwakev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134634919/9162717.pdf
    • https://fowuwulavo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134754099/nadutujumepiriro.pdf
    • https://pezazexumazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135392870/felazopomowojilonewi.pdf
    • https://niraxonaweza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134000156/subaxitu.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4373519/normal_600bcad04322f.pdf
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4491969/normal_5ffba4ce57c0d.pdf
    • https://rowikaxaruwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134863505/jetofegodonol.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4489850/normal_602a9e34842ab.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/najipavez/what_does_wps_button_do_on_att_router.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sedimeraxufi/video_cutter_free_android.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/be17e765-545a-4508-98e2-32f1fe53f273/how_much_do_ministers_get_paid.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gulapore/convert_multiple_jpg_to_android.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6ec89c39-8a37-41e3-bc9c-03ccc989a003/pesapefikogoseguv.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c7b1.bin
e9ac3872aba7366cda82e6d4bad9ee2ad1274c817cc8f9efb7e6ff76c98f4021
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC7B1 5032 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d8b6.bin
93ee2509978acb0387f19b757d060d2c32d1947c4ebb25cf04a8e08bb604568c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD8B6 5072 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000ebee.bin
6a86bd9d974db6d60e2667924e73a86d0fb8a0f7230d4242208f760c71caa3f4
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEBEE 10596 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off00011015.bin
9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11015 4324 bytes