Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c2a0c68a471d8c0…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

115.3 KB First seen: 2026-02-16
MD5: 965f8d2fd7126df1cf9f5e3a33730b53 SHA-1: 3b920f55aef809e2cc924f134df293bfee74a6cf SHA-256: 1c2a0c68a471d8c04321cb5d4f463fd02f8fea18a9546d019a0c75669054bc62
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation targeting the Equation Editor, specifically triggering RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJUPDATE, and RTF_OBJAUTLINK heuristics. These indicate the document is designed to leverage a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component to achieve code execution. No specific malware family was identified, but the exploitation vector is clear.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000084e.bin
b30e6cac07637470a66d0a3169cfb0b6255bf29346feebc7f55330eab73b7bbf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x84E 4183 bytes