Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c2329180d18cc2c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.6 KB Created: 2020-10-16 22:28:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 5880fa027c73715c760b21768d1ba926 SHA-1: 639a1ccc4c318b414c7f62ae1222673bf1e6a643 SHA-256: 1c2329180d18cc2c6f035f8f5628807180b66141d81fc7dcc10fac1672fa6588
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting and one is identified as a malicious redirector. This suggests the document is designed to lure users to malicious sites, likely for phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the structure and link farm behavior are indicative of a malicious document.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/123?keyword=structured+cabling+system+design+guidelines In PDF document text
    • https://nogafuku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815296/molabixaxekibi-fukanosabituf-sulumunovitadez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lefedatit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776734/5937df.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xuwuperozaposa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303395/zunarules.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://waniremupamed.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407535/5086702.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366989/normal_5f874e06b2b5e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365607/normal_5f8736c60f7cd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4371524/normal_5f8888352dcd5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366676/normal_5f89671cd3977.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://naxesitigas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740165/rejagox-pipuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nosekuge.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740467/bavevojujaw-wuzegitagazeb-gorurad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0502/4920/3885/files/bluedio_turbine_hurricane_h_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0484/3592/1064/files/math_intervention_programs_for_elementary_school.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0268/7231/6080/files/jaduvoworifitajoxawig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/47e2f68d-3301-4cce-b242-f4269e3cd367/11716040023.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/19c773c3-6c40-480d-b3a8-012256d7f2d5/musalibotakene.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5dc8ab03-3b78-4c45-b502-12c4f74abd0d/24647362478.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008aee.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8AEE 5604 bytes
SHA-256: 4f2a4d00a6164ca9b214b729cd1a1259a9b93717209b1dcb340699dca7d15bb6
font_01_sfnt_off00009ddf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9DDF 10440 bytes
SHA-256: 23d17526f3d1ec93ca9dc53e39bb9e789f910633b53e88b2ceaabef511c6e0e8

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