Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c1b76cf7dccd221…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.65 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: f509ad3f4398f4e0cf0a2dad0c2b78c7 SHA-1: 247183e5cf1c7af5d7b6b166d99c7276ad284004 SHA-256: 1c1b76cf7dccd221c2ff1cdae41505539dc30c6c59bdd3e7442ee441d1e697dc
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that is activated by \objupdate, exploiting CVE-2017-8759. This indicates a likely attack pattern involving the exploitation of a vulnerability in Microsoft Office applications to achieve code execution. The specific exploit, CVE-2017-8759, is a critical finding. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, making it difficult to determine the exact second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0019e927.bin
01a6483bf0c9e92fd3f3a6b6528c354f569d2aa32862dcddb09f22fb3881a4c6		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x19E927 3739 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.