Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1c1434b42a1e4f14…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.2 KB Created: 2020-08-23 09:02:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: d1d0efedb5e6cd741514d994bcb70a35 SHA-1: ab8109a97636f3d5aea58bf9044ffc4d4934c4bf SHA-256: 1c1434b42a1e4f14b3181ea80b4ad61de66ac182cbb65b2bfa14bc6d803ad52a
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF contains a lure related to WhatsApp and Windows 7, directing users to a malicious redirector. It also exhibits characteristics of a link farm, with numerous embedded URLs pointing to external resources, some of which are benign but others are unknown or malicious. The heuristic 'SE_MFA_LURE' indicates the document is designed to harvest credentials or abuse multi-factor authentication, suggesting a phishing attempt.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=whatsapp++2018+laptop+windows+7
    • http://vipekapet.lorainedavies.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408832/bazajanezijobu.pdf
    • http://files.surprisescorpionsaz.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775565/suvixogo.pdf
    • http://nipukif.hermosahistory.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776322/japavujidad.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0460/0653/4303/files/string_format_c_example.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0839/2353/files/dark_souls_2_human_effigy_farming.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6674/4214/files/tugugazopiwizesokej.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5415/4406/files/aao_na_lyrics.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8890/3325/files/29750053400.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0382/9657/files/free_fifty_shades_of_grey_trilogy.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/6903/7980/files/woromugoxabijuvolenigowe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/9446/5948/files/google_classroom_training.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/4576/3744/files/kobubatamu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006876.bin
72c23aecd5a75629a5dd923f708d1ba3a3f73f69bf0b5902bd09aea2f735a64a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6876 5324 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007a9c.bin
742fc7261a30371c9df57235fd618b6efeaabdc72a1bd11d1580577643415b02
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7A9C 10448 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00009e13.bin
4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9E13 4324 bytes