Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1bd8a7010a4913c9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.6 KB First seen: 2022-11-07
MD5: b3b523bf80d9700cb369ae2e409de9d3 SHA-1: f8bc6d6cf32f27d1843fb573596adca828a191d7 SHA-256: 1bd8a7010a4913c9c1f239e03799c222b8ac15b66d02020b6234a88337a1dc68
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content. This combination strongly suggests the file is designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004837.bin
d9227195669bbf7d81acec8e78590f6fc5cc912a5b9f8022db5ec9c065639c77
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4837 1906 bytes