Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1bbe1061b556359e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

339.4 KB Created: 2010-08-06 13:39:53 Authoring application: Microsoft® Office Word 2007 First seen: 2012-09-20
MD5: 44f980e56598f4600ee0271aade16449 SHA-1: 7ba9776563ae15839b47437a3873dba4fc085dae SHA-256: 1bbe1061b556359ec3d7affd1bace8a2ffbebe1fdeae47e9d70d60ddacdf0eb8
624 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating an attempt to execute cmd.exe. This is further supported by the PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD heuristic, which identified an embedded Windows executable. The CVE_2010_1240 heuristic confirms the exploit targets a known Adobe Reader vulnerability for command execution. The embedded executable is likely a second-stage payload, and the mailto URI suggests a potential phishing or social engineering vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9984

Heuristics 16

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
    PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\Comunidad_Valenciana2.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI low PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://webs.ono.com/usr004/Jaimepro/ PDF link annotation
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/SMI/2005/WindowsSettingsReferenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://fontfabrik.comYouPDF link annotation
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxPDF link annotation
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CSPCA.crl0HPDF link annotation
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/CSPCA.crt0PDF link annotation
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/tspca.crl0HPDF link annotation
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/tspca.crt0PDF link annotation
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typographyPDF link annotation
    • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/PDF link annotation

Related samples 2

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
Comunidad_Valenciana2.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 188 at offset 0x24114 302228 bytes
SHA-256: d9351745ca0d87e1b119e5d8965532bfeb23e784668d15a7dd6faadc0ea30f95
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=Comunidad_Valenciana2.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file
javascript_obj0189_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 189 at offset 0x5488C 70 bytes
SHA-256: 439691fcba3f127d2724a3adfb9f387fc561cc78c26b5c60bb688f2cbcca27c3
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "Comunidad_Valenciana2", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_008_off0000d74f.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xD74F 185880 bytes
SHA-256: 734b945b274d84d405d6f2494dca31579ee1308dc3bfac2968b06562f5fe86ac
font_00_sfnt_off0000365b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x365B 71304 bytes
SHA-256: fdac126b0940c88663311a42f8f5cc4f8d52cb6f82a095c57cad8e0bb2d6cf56
font_01_sfnt_off00009bac.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9BAC 55512 bytes
SHA-256: 39cdd4febfe9c832d26c7cbafd5b40b3bb9728d408a883b6febd258a7115006a

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