Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1b3ec0c10b5a947a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.8 KB Created: 2021-02-16 22:19:19 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: 83a703412ee024be2b04069ce298adb5 SHA-1: dd9f264242b02fbf50a142bdfe51a1e81ee4cfe2 SHA-256: 1b3ec0c10b5a947aae8c8d1996f39553434e1a6fa5a1fba726f14fca2852ebd8
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a malicious redirector link that points to a URL designed to phish for user information. The document body, though malformed, suggests a pretext of requesting updated contact information. The presence of numerous other PDF links further indicates a link farm designed to distribute malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wix?keyword=sample+letter+requesting+updated+contact+information In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4387711/normal_5fd8fbafd49d4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sazadasixitabe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134404720/6fa472f999cc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4408319/normal_5ff288fe21337.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dubibezu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453247/e9fc5c522.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4463560/normal_6015fffaf23c0.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4415935/normal_6027125e71b28.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4499002/normal_5fd347001429e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rollernefrit.xyz/wowawowodavuefvbe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/salosibejodod/jazinidixobadeno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vefagotoje/57116446578.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kesumasaka/sagojaxuwolipiso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xovekolamoxe/cute_cat_coloring_sheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/suxiweke/how_to_use_battery_calibration_pro_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gekabogaramal.rf.gd/dupont_tyvek_tape_data_sheet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nekogepi.epizy.com/hunter_full_movie_480p.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gijomifede.rf.gd/2013_elantra_gls_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xidulumexi/30985124998.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rodakarugupoko/ndis_quarterly_report_dashboard.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://garubokiboja.rf.gd/90830879255.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jusagi/razebetizepafadix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d766.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD766 5704 bytes
SHA-256: 516dfee3d1b79522e93964a7bd1a7c9faaaf332f54c488fdf853efaf07cf377e
font_01_sfnt_off0000eab3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAB3 10196 bytes
SHA-256: 29ca5534419e0e86cf8670ecef1e82aa74d3cfd8a2fedbf9c287ea353d598c8a