Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1b16f40d8627b58f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.8 KB Created: 2020-12-22 01:39:42 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: b842f1c126ce2630485bf1d84c380d45 SHA-1: d6a23b7512278b5cf233fbcbefcf36d6327aa936 SHA-256: 1b16f40d8627b58fd3c600fc929e10077158169456651719c32c58da79930758
226 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by a machine learning classifier and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The document contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed for SEO manipulation or phishing. The 'SE_MFA_LURE' heuristic indicates the document is likely attempting to harvest credentials or session tokens by mimicking multi-factor authentication prompts. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm heuristics point towards a phishing attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffine.ru/123?utm_term=matlab+manual+pdf+download
    • https://wuxelulomevadi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/9/134904547/80c2fd1f8f49c.pdf
    • https://tumafivefaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999435/siriguragerogifet.pdf
    • https://gebopudexor.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134482947/xuwiger_vakuze_morebovogofulov_kusuworozeti.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370074/normal_5f8d35f3995c8.pdf
    • https://kaperimivegorew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134371305/fetajopu-kefabazekupo-tipapulexuninof.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366005/normal_5f8ccde7d4eac.pdf
    • https://mosozedap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856454/8832421.pdf
    • https://xasuvakem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134400919/390a4ea4a02f4.pdf
    • https://radunepik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134617153/318d2d7e817b.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fbce344be7cfc36344e8aaf/t/5fbd121d1ea14523495942f8/1606226461972/qu_genix_reviews_nyc.pdf
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fdfe9c7f67c863bcd18f266/t/5fe111d7bdd81f07749d024b/1608585690285/92819298271.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4380db1a-5237-4d2e-a4be-9d3ca258cc85/98488795494.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8b266eba-ccd4-4ebd-85d1-fe0e95e1e6b0/28190432549.pdf
    • http://se.mathworks.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bdef.bin
defcde9991dab51a99ec21e281fea4a37499d79256b7f5d03ab1c615dafeb836
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBDEF 4864 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ce6e.bin
80373393bbef44b14e637b43feef5589956e86e0241fd7e1c30a150235a1620d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCE6E 11192 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000f481.bin
a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF481 4324 bytes