Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1b16c4990afa8c09…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.1 KB Created: 2021-01-13 16:37:00 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 0d4ee94991923d6ec549c0b08fafe227 SHA-1: b2780b18dc2b4229955dacfd74b900ea470e7bdc SHA-256: 1b16c4990afa8c0922f9a0a0bee97f5ec819561ad5bdc1af9e03fe28c8f96667
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains multiple embedded URLs, with a critical heuristic firing indicating a redirect to known malicious infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to 'Amazon fba business plan template pdf'. The presence of numerous links on disposable hosting further supports a malicious intent, likely to phish for credentials or distribute further malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/aws?utm_term=amazon+fba+business+plan+template+pdf
    • https://gekowodi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135321574/kaxow.pdf
    • https://bidalafurita.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134591929/6033677.pdf
    • https://saxibodusazo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740440/rakuvudabasim-gubaxevuruwojix.pdf
    • https://xetutinafo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775845/9d751e44ad6.pdf
    • https://vuzevarezevarot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740461/3f7bdb1fc.pdf
    • https://mezamavizasiv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135312133/tukevokujes_tomado_toditiguxamof.pdf
    • https://site-1194286.mozfiles.com/files/1194286/hack_killer_bean_unleashed_game_download.pdf
    • https://site-1176476.mozfiles.com/files/1176476/download_snake_zone_io_mod.pdf
    • https://site-1178514.mozfiles.com/files/1178514/juwomuwopas.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wapabefizosumi/83951492989.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/daraniwekamidir/banking_ombudsman_scheme_2019.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/faxaxos/42969022018.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xakajoziwibi/sepegakaxomegepavokisig.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tugabijenovili/gurexuwidagisola.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pazerogasarinu/65186147624.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e3a8.bin
01ff7226024d4de7d1c57976c1a57b009e027b14283dfd2e260c352ac704109c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE3A8 5152 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f517.bin
bc968f08bedaef58a9a83d123cb0eaee942ee5773be1965f60929fa0000e44a1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF517 10480 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000118f1.bin
b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x118F1 4324 bytes

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