Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1b10158267c86539…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.15 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-05
MD5: f12b04777a2d481cb6cac05fba2bf6b0 SHA-1: 6e9a321bc5530ca5cbbd74b3ae0e0ea287c513fc SHA-256: 1b10158267c865398a43869316cfb092c75198b39aa1e673b8d31a0eac2e3452
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor object known to exploit CVE-2017-11882. This object is used to deliver a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, contains a direct link to an executable or archive. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, indicating they are not the primary infection vector. The embedded PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
630313461964122a0ac0643d9f830a218fd3787a4181dcde0dfec742a8791acb		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD000665CD/OLE10nAtiVE 1775 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0006d000.pdf
013088dd572d6e64ac9eb5b2fbcd0940b215ba1254c304554297727a147124da		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6D000 761856 bytes
stream_004_off00005d60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5D60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
f79d63728088a425c79e2a1b5038358efca178d33d677426d8aca5bdef25bd3b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1203712 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
cc824bfd87f6b7709d10ea9b9ed343df98b713a7e0d74bcd21215cf7b8204aff		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1182208 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029600.pdf
8fa8ce39187b1c3289be0f00c9780647867af766f79e5154185f7a884c2aa73b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29600 1038848 bytes

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