Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ae650453a47cbf7…

MALICIOUS

RTF

439.6 KB Created: 2019-10-07 21:04:00 First seen: 2019-12-10
MD5: feeab7c41b73d8f03b3d4d005a8b8bf3 SHA-1: cb4da77e47fbb97b9dab5c42fe8ff42bb25953a5 SHA-256: 1ae650453a47cbf7872860245c7feff1dc7f82e9afc0ae9d431b66ca6f324ade
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains OLE object data and an \objupdate directive, indicating an attempt to activate embedded objects. The critical CVE-2017-8759 heuristic firing confirms that the sample exploits MSXML SAX OLE activation to achieve code execution. This is commonly used as a method to deliver a secondary payload, likely via a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://download.macromedia.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab In RTF body
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordmlIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000038d1.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x38D1 42110 bytes
SHA-256: 0ed774ba4843f55bcebe3aa41cbfd67607241813c4f33c2f33f5edf2743af394