Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ad53115974ef355…

MALICIOUS

PDF

49.4 KB Created: 2020-08-01 20:39:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 46b2a60667b9fb6c0265ea8c0b57f26e SHA-1: fff92fcb2af603b03c15949f3ed8fb5b0472ea1e SHA-256: 1ad53115974ef355338909592d8b1966ea712ec9f6bf6a1d511e924b9130bef9
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to Shopify domains, but one critical link redirects to a known malicious domain (ttraff.com). The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the text 'How to fill a big reactor' and the malicious URL, suggesting a lure to a malicious site. The heuristic firings confirm the presence of a malicious redirector link and a link farm within the PDF.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=how+to+fill+a+big+reactor
    • http://files.azpadu.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380397/xonakolozedu.pdf
    • http://files.audioclassic.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738548/pasuxuma.pdf
    • http://files.willowsageco.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814680/segekorokota.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/3943/8501/files/pativotelom.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/1828/8285/files/29211143377.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/porovurujapiganipuzul.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0874/3834/files/donibu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2127/9137/files/susitoxexipuzom.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3760/5544/files/mozejisifepufuzuxapat.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6993/1673/files/93266839858.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4101/3412/files/53198341042.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/5778/3718/files/vuketekejofapimuxixuvogi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/9689/8724/files/gewuwotobimosabakobo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9636/7511/files/vajukodezu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007779.bin
46bdee2dd89d2b52e8bb3906f597fd35b5c18540340c7af79958f4c02f9ec7d4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7779 4744 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000087c0.bin
737b57d79d67532373c8dcc332ace9d4e46323d2ad427f41fd95a5856fc9a994		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x87C0 10280 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000aaf1.bin
d1f4a20f0e35a0564be54678b929bb8c711862c507f070c2b9a6abea8daf4378		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAAF1 4324 bytes

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