Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ace452af06a45f6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB
MD5: 9f82fbbd64a198727f2ac32ff49524e2 SHA-1: 48cbbd277cd5f301d6b5b5162d676c95afbd78bd SHA-256: 1ace452af06a45f6d148ee2ebd32e9b6b2c5241a2cbb7353628c5b59b478fc5e
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript/TypeScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and triggers a critical heuristic for CVE-2010-2883, indicating an exploit attempt targeting Adobe Reader. The presence of XFA forms and ASCIIHexDecode filters further supports this. The primary attack vector is likely the exploitation of this vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution, potentially leading to the download of additional malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit — CVE-2010-2883 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_2883
    PDF embeds a TrueType/OpenType font with an actual SING table and pairs it with JavaScript heap-spray shellcode. This matches the public Adobe Reader CoolType SING exploit shape for CVE-2010-2883.
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.6/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0012_000.js
f5f1b7d2e8656147bbf219aa0f4448f5392cbcd4ecdaee67617b91ecd9b99b40		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 12 at offset 0xA0BA 3700 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000033c.bin
683fcffe9abaad29001e134bdd9ad7d1628d5cbbf628c451b6c621f202a7dae4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x33C 65932 bytes

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