Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ab152e4d5f3c385…

MALICIOUS

PDF

51.4 KB Created: 2020-10-01 20:10:37 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: c49e72c5a9b3fc9c08e5f5e96f6b64ef SHA-1: d9b3b204193a3e2e1beb68d7254c3c3851b5fdb5 SHA-256: 1ab152e4d5f3c3856716063939dd2102b1906e113ede80402493f192c45e8b74
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=bharat+gas+new+connection+application+form+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://site-1037048.mozfiles.com/files/1037048/laserofebanilariputeme.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037149.mozfiles.com/files/1037149/kowabil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039795.mozfiles.com/files/1039795/zitemivubesepe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037156.mozfiles.com/files/1037156/wepojesilesosaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://witug.thelotuscollaborative.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856166/telususo-serifezetawud-berunatuf-megoxeborukev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tavanarix.kpcecala.net/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383770/kitafituvozowusale.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037233.mozfiles.com/files/1037233/19830678617.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036798.mozfiles.com/files/1036798/86752465432.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036750.mozfiles.com/files/1036750/xuzisidaxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039510.mozfiles.com/files/1039510/luzugadusa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039324.mozfiles.com/files/1039324/mibatobozamanutipipasavog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/10d11b88-dc38-44e7-88ae-f2c2e838814a/rafikuridiwuxan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cec7acd7-483c-47d9-a3da-905e20d2d6bb/doxexajune.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d8037851-715b-4575-bfd4-a0b994950dca/sediku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007db5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7DB5 5500 bytes
SHA-256: ad9cc8fbd8c90634c52df1d856d2a78fa3d72fae7a201d934643e4ed13052cd7
font_01_sfnt_off0000904d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x904D 9888 bytes
SHA-256: 4d150b5ea21818963c048410b0e776240852d1eb768321bd6b35f30ca51c40b9
font_02_sfnt_off0000b236.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB236 4324 bytes
SHA-256: b50a2106bf82917db0cd3cf88f63c5e8cc3298b343ace5cffc591b35df33d24c

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