Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1aa8d22e5751869d…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.24 MB
MD5: 5cf1f752711153e10c98282709acfd12 SHA-1: 652792dff9908e5ec651f3ec0674541836e314ac SHA-256: 1aa8d22e5751869d856ba6fab36f95bc697e0c6c13b90bad050998143ccee5a1
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The file is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. This indicates the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability, likely leading to arbitrary code execution when opened. The presence of multiple ".objdata" sections and ".objupdate" directives further supports the exploitation of embedded objects for malicious purposes.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
2b9d8f2813ee2facacd0909bdc78c562fe41d629ab65fbd0e81ea22976e58253
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27688 bytes
objdata_01_off0001d25d.bin
05fc6d2b0a81484fefcb6cc6d4891013e53501190027c21cdd96bf0ea0957523
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D25D 478713 bytes