Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1a88755d678b1295…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.2 KB Created: 2021-01-14 19:47:03 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 29dbfd2ee84fe7608f3becf865384e50 SHA-1: d8d93ad51e05199512fd307879ede295b646c272 SHA-256: 1a88755d678b12954452b6df4e041e142189b90eb8f48616cf5bb7791a5525a0
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains multiple embedded links, with at least one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure (traffmen.ru). Heuristics indicate it's a link farm on disposable hosting, and a machine learning classifier strongly flags it as malicious. The ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature, identifying it as Pdf.Phishing.Trojan. No scripts were extracted, but the primary attack pattern involves luring users to malicious sites via embedded links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/aws?utm_term=aegisub+karaoke+effect+lua In PDF document text
    • https://site-1196306.mozfiles.com/files/1196306/nasidipexipixuwe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nobozufale.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322784/febf6d2a38631.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mevinabepoke.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740553/3717310.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1177846.mozfiles.com/files/1177846/gamma_horizon_mobile_app_user_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dufofumiwiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135309849/voregim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1168003.mozfiles.com/files/1168003/74906853770.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xalitizamer.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134863297/fbd2263c2b5ce58.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1171687.mozfiles.com/files/1171687/rixugoxidipunop.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xuzopodoker.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738955/jovujepudu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vuzufexarevima/ssc_stenographer_2015_question_paper_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mujesogi/anth_movie_full_hd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vazisi/superga_platform_sneakers_canada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jitimesolagun/vidmate_app_install_apk_mirror.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gixirojozogufux/job_interview_questions_template_word.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/meludav/rikaxerazawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d447.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD447 9316 bytes
SHA-256: e6de210631a2897352f6ddab4efc8456be093cc4156ce7819778ea1ef5c89577
font_01_sfnt_off0000f2e8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF2E8 5240 bytes
SHA-256: 0be37b6095659c0edd219f7b406cfd4a788bf9dab4e675e41ecafb294a9932ec
font_02_sfnt_off000104db.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x104DB 11364 bytes
SHA-256: d859e399678c8c39f75955227e161ad7613e2ec6536c964dd7958b9ce8b0c682

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