RTF malware analysis — malicious · 1a7f73810fe77606

MALICIOUS

RTF

101.0 KB First seen: 2024-09-06

MD5: 124bfb183c9b3f3b757fa9559967ab95 SHA-1: e2004e5b5803b0ab65c9b8142808f9367a9b1c8a SHA-256: 1a7f73810fe77606fa0b04f8425407e39b2c6ba612cb287d56b7e46506781840

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation targeting Microsoft Equation Editor, specifically leveraging OLE object data and automatic linking for activation. This suggests the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to execute arbitrary code. The embedded OLE object data is the primary mechanism for delivering the exploit, aiming to download and run a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001bac.bin` `2068bcb3b995bbd52b85c1bcdcffcff25dde868bdafdca86d1bd59f78d100db0`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BAC	2066 bytes

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