PDF malware analysis — malicious · 1a7c116b3493f675

MALICIOUS

PDF

11.6 KB

MD5: 072da7bf4d99c0d7d9f11ce21a32a6b8 SHA-1: 8be582b9cb9572d693ad8d04631d2770c10d0e33 SHA-256: 1a7c116b3493f67577c14a0350702da24a12802c86c4f747e02bb8f03562677b

186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, specifically leveraging the CVE-2007-5659 vulnerability via the 'collab.collectEmailInfo' function. This JavaScript is heavily obfuscated and staged, with recovered artifacts named 'annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js' and 'deobfuscated.js'. The primary function of the script appears to be downloading and executing a second-stage payload, indicated by the heuristic firings and the nature of the embedded code.

Heuristics 7

Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659

PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER

PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN

PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`javascript_obj0007_000.js` `eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D	273 bytes
`annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js` `dc51bc67d33095544b0c164e79097e8a5e332f43247e26fe1c2b1a306c467b56`	deobfuscated-js	annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A	4928 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
`deobfuscated.js` `2e93a13e527ba254f2573fff7a588a20e04a2cb15f5f2ce448fa15b5615b43d5`	deobfuscated-js	PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass	73657 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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