Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1a5b15b2be0615e8…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

688.4 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 2778b0a75a8b79777152d66052cf041d SHA-1: 0ede784720ee3bea45ca96f6d7a6b4c42e3b2cd7 SHA-256: 1a5b15b2be0615e8f31a29e7130822f88d4aa3b9365493c7c9065f0bcc6785b6
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability associated with Equation Editor. This suggests the document is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening, likely as a downloader or initial access vector.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000a353b.bin
f01ee5470706b1fb69ad7841d0291a529d062275f8ad9bd0b3b5acbce4076190
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA353B 3739 bytes