Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1a447aa45f410300…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

313.6 KB
MD5: 67511a896419975ff78f55ae03e9ffef SHA-1: 13f4d98b367eeab9711f0b537db18b2e4405fe1d SHA-256: 1a447aa45f410300aab375552ac1ff4425388d9c9959051da7013cd8d3ae004b
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution: Malicious File T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability. This vulnerability is known to be used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The heuristic firings strongly indicate exploitation of the Equation Editor, leading to the execution of a Portable Executable (PE) file. The extracted artifact 'objdata_00_off00001aec.bin' is the decoded payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Decoded Equation Editor payload + PE critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation Editor ProgID adjacent to OLE activation and the same decoded object stream contains embedded PE bytes. This matches the Equation Editor exploit surface used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 documents, while requiring payload evidence to avoid flagging benign Equation references.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001aec.bin
815f462dfaa06b28f2e9c5c65f21c13aa961152623519ef40952605a3dce35c0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1AEC 156845 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.