Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1a3bd2b2da53be11…

MALICIOUS

PDF

61.2 KB Created: 2020-11-11 02:53:23 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 08141a99e0a2cca6956a512303d3d62b SHA-1: b577aacc4f19804f957020f17acc01df864a59c9 SHA-256: 1a3bd2b2da53be11d91cb4c017937cb49af18cd83faf3bc72ae35feb2b30c75e
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The file is identified as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, with a high risk score. It contains an embedded URI pointing to a suspicious domain, which is likely intended to host a phishing page or further malicious content. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text that appears to be a lure related to 'Pablo escobar meme waiting'. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure and embedded URI suggest a phishing attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/aws?keyword=pablo+escobar+meme+waiting
    • https://tadadali.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134095934/lukixonuxadinef_semakaduke_zadajexiliduvi_difukavasojujex.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4406481/normal_5fa690ccb4c01.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4381102/normal_5f9240db2132e.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4405195/normal_5fab33178c0a2.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377100/normal_5f9b71b227c5a.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bokofapig/aprender_a_leer_pentagrama.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/niporofez/windbg_cheat_sheet.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zidosozawok/redorojopetinare.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gizonukorad/xanidelogabezegowosujeg.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jojitagifuva/zibenitumawezegikoguv.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fekaduvopigab/87938447556.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b324.bin
311ecd5650ea569a92b4431ba584b9eb3f85ca27f782f3628d17bb9563d6e58b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB324 5352 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000c551.bin
e90bed3404490d91fd199da3e61bc0c7b1547381895cbe227d3c9096860e86cd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC551 10208 bytes