Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1a2e311fe9087083…

MALICIOUS

RTF

701.0 KB Created: 2018-04-20 20:36:00 First seen: 2018-05-08
MD5: 628c65f6e48f7b6b8e537315954c7704 SHA-1: d37bb1ea6deb8b9fcfe37a03e2fe45d9de41f0bc SHA-256: 1a2e311fe9087083544b76f36d908c9f3ec427009c70f210be1bd8c7bca42288
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects, with a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759 which indicates exploitation of MSXML SAX OLE activation. The presence of \objupdate directives further suggests that these embedded objects are designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document. This points to a likely attack pattern of exploiting this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code, probably to download and run a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 10 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002d9f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2D9F 21051 bytes
SHA-256: 82a9bd53f7df7520b7cff7982101f2516e1e9d93b41cce879b98ebeb5ca0f7c0
objdata_01_off00012be0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x12BE0 21051 bytes
SHA-256: 5d4230614cce0ae3bb2e00d08863ffe6d5ffca4139d08e2e56269bcb9b754f2a
objdata_02_off00022abb.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x22ABB 21051 bytes
SHA-256: f4d1f31a9149b3cfcab72bd12b60d52fd86f71541431c8fe96b55c777aa81632
objdata_03_off0003294c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3294C 21051 bytes
SHA-256: 5b05e31e4c6b7476c3d9c896b85f12483f6de49f4206e1586fb2f7df042137aa
objdata_04_off000427dd.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x427DD 21051 bytes
SHA-256: 9e2667aadd21453a01eedd4e36e22ac724f8fa183f1949e9f1106d238a68deb8
objdata_05_off0005266e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5266E 21051 bytes
SHA-256: a05ab9bc81c9729240cb1c447a21a6803f4e7f90b523f808d705766e91999229
objdata_06_off000624ff.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x624FF 21051 bytes
SHA-256: 350c32285a55261a899dd80dc983196ec2455db71e0e83c8f44c693dc92a70fa
objdata_09_off000920b2.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x920B2 21051 bytes
SHA-256: f91c1355fed13e6fb4ea48e9c204c933a3652ed78c34292b93fa1249cff4663b

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