Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1a151a7b290fe62f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.56 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 8eec84819bec7e814045158633ca12c5 SHA-1: a87a29d5ad0a5f0b26569b5118443a376957c13a SHA-256: 1a151a7b290fe62f540a4f2ba9e98f231041c7731d14fa243a0d7776fd5a3bd2
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, which allows for arbitrary code execution. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections further supports the exploitation of embedded objects. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing content, but the technical indicators strongly suggest a malicious payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00176299.bin
55cb74e1b22860c4172bdfe9ad755fbf3fb27d21e21bac288cab507c95fd6637
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x176299 3732 bytes