RTF malware analysis — malicious · 19f90bd14a1fc45f

MALICIOUS

RTF

12.4 KB First seen: 2022-03-24

MD5: fe283b70f135da751a838364f0c3d81f SHA-1: bf1a097a6031efe7988da54bc4f7ff715c5ecac3 SHA-256: 19f90bd14a1fc45fdb797e204deb81b313da9de9eb901fabac58115ff6a9ca1d

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploiting Microsoft Equation Editor, specifically ".objdata" sections, automatic linking of OLE objects, and forced updates. These heuristics strongly suggest the file is designed to trigger an exploit, likely CVE-2017-11882, which is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of OLE object data further supports this attack vector.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001fef.bin` `01602c939198b0036f791b77236374d04d74c8d557493ce44229bdb3456ec59e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1FEF	2112 bytes

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